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As the abolitionist movement gained momentum in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, agricultural producers in Cuba and South America 
urgently began looking for substitutes for their African slaves. The result was 
a massive growth in the “coolie trade”––the trafficking of laborers known 
as coolies––from China to plantations overseas.1 On paper, the indentured 
workers were abroad legally and voluntarily and were given regular salaries, 
certain benefits, as well as various legal rights not granted to slaves. In 
practice, however, coolies were often kidnapped before departure and abused 
upon arrival. Their relatively low wages and theoretically legal status attracted 
employers in agricultural production around the world. Virtually all the 
European colonies employed coolies; from the Spanish sugar plantations in 
Cuba to the German coconut fields in Samoa, coolies were a critical source of 
labor. For the trade in coolies between China and Latin America, a handful of 
Spanish conglomerates, such as La Zulueta y Compañía and La Alianza, held 
the monopoly. Assisted by Spanish diplomatic outposts, these conglomerates 
established coolie stations along the south Chinese coast to facilitate the 
transportation of laborers. Their branches across the globe handled the 
logistics, marketing, and finances of the trade. The substantial profits accrued 
from the high demand for labor encouraged the gradual expansion of the trade 
after 1847, with the highest number of coolies being shipped to Cuba and Peru 
in the 1860s and 1870s. By 1874, over 260,000 indentured Chinese workers 
had embarked for the ports of Havana (140,000+)2 and Lima (120,000+)3, and 
in due course these workers had an enormous impact on global agricultural 
production.4
The approach pursued in this study has greatly benefitted from the debates on transcultural 
interaction in the Cluster “Asia and Europe in a Global Context: Shifting Asymmetries in Cultural 
Flows” at Heidelberg University as well as from the advice and support of Rudolf Wagner, Hans van 
de Ven, Gabriela Ramos, Andrea Hacker, Antje Fluechter, Frank Gruener and Martin Dusinberre, as 
well as valuable comments by two anonymous readers. All remaining errors are mine.
1 In addition to the coolies from China, a significant number of coolies also came from India and 
from various islands in the Pacific. For the purposes of this paper, however, the term “coolie” refers to 
the Chinese laborers, as they represented the overwhelming majority of human “products” that were 
being sent to Cuba and South America in the nineteenth century.
2 Juan Perez de la Riva, “Demografía de los culíes chinos en Cuba (1853-1874),” El barracón y 
otros ensayos (La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales), 471.
3 Arnold Meagher, The Coolie Trade: The Traffic in Chinese Laborers to Latin America, 1847-1874 
(Bloomington: Xlibris), 222.
4 This impact was not merely a substantial growth of the agricultural production (sugar, above all) 
in Latin America, but also the transition of the production mode from a manual-based agriculture to 
the much more efficient, machine-based production. See Mary Turner, “Chinese Contract Labour in 
Cuba, 1847–1874,” Caribbean Studies 14 (July 1974): 66–81; Fernando Ortiz, Contrapunteo cubano 
del tabaco y el azúcar (1940) (Madrid: Cátedra, 2002); Sidney Mintz, Sweetness and Power: The 
Place of Sugar in Modern History (New York: Viking, 1985).
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The lucrative coolie trade between China and Latin America came to an abrupt end 
in the 1870s after allegations of abuse in the international press were subsequently 
confirmed by Western diplomats.5 A series of diplomatic struggles ensued between 
the Qing Dynasty and the Spanish Crown over the treatment of the coolies. Five 
nations–– England, Russia, France, Germany, and the United States––mediated 
between the two, but ultimately, they supported the Chinese case. These diplomatic 
disagreements resulted in the dispatch of a Qing delegation to Cuba to investigate 
the allegations of mistreatment. Its final report described the appalling working 
conditions of the Chinese coolies in the Spanish possessions. After the report 
was made public, resistance to the trade grew in Southern China, and the Spanish 
government was forced to end the trade in laborers between China and Latin America 
before both governments had even signed a final written agreement banning it.
The Qing delegation to Cuba, which ultimately brought down the global coolie 
network between China and the Spanish-speaking world, was covered extensively 
by the Chinese and international press throughout much of the 1870s.6 Information 
about the creation of the Commission, its journey, and the final report appeared in 
newspapers across the globe. As was already evident in contemporary assessments, 
the delegation’s journey was of historic significance, and many predicted it 
would have a huge impact on the Sino–Spanish coolie trade and on international 
agricultural production. Moreover, unlike repeated Chinese defeats at the hands 
of foreign powers, the Commission represented one of the few instances in the 
nineteenth century when the Qing Dynasty scored a diplomatic victory against a 
European nation. Yet, despite its great historical significance, rather surprisingly, 
the Chinese Commission to Cuba has not been thoroughly examined by historians; 
as a consequence, the general public remains relatively unaware of the Commission 
and its significance.7 For the same historical period, historians of Sino–foreign 
5 Most of the Chinese coolies were sent to Cuba and Peru. The coolie trade to these two locations 
was stopped in 1874. The Qing government signed a separate agreement with Peru for another 
investigation to take place in Peru. See “The Treaty between China and Peru,” North China Herald, 
August 8, 1874.
6 The Chinese press in this paper refers to the newspapers printed in China at the time, including 
both Chinese-language and English-language periodicals. In the 1870s major papers published in 
China included the Chinese–language Shenbao 申報 (1872–1949), the Wanguo Gongbao 萬國公
報 (1868–1907), and the English-language North China Herald (1850–1951) in Shanghai, and the 
Xunhuan Ribao 循環日報 (1874–1947), as well as the China Mail (1845–1974) in Hong Kong. For 
further discussions on newspapers and public sphere in China during this period, read Rudolf Wagner, 
ed., Joining the Global Public: Word, Image, and City in Early Chinese Newspapers, 1870–1910 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 2007). For a specific study on the Shenbao, see Barbara Mittler, A Newspaper 
for China? Power, Identity, and Change in Shanghai’s News Media, 1872–1912 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Asia Center, 2004).
7 In addition to the negative responses gleaned from casual discussions with my Chinese 
acquaintances, my review of a few Chinese textbooks found no mention of the Commission or of the 
1877 treaty between Spain and China.
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relations have instead focused their attention on the Treaty of Nanking (1842), 
the Treaty of Tientsin (1858), and the Convention of Peking (1860). It is therefore 
worth asking why this extraordinary Chinese Commission to Cuba and the 
resulting Sino–Spanish treaty of 1877 have been largely ignored by scholarship as 
well as by the public. Seeking to address this lacuna in the scholarship, this paper 
examines the origin of the Commission, its investigation, and the consequences 
of its findings. Furthermore, in view of the primary sources that have been made 
public in Spanish and Chinese archives during the last decades, the history of the 
Commission suggests that a basic reexamination of Sino–foreign relations in the 
nineteenth century is called for. Of no less importance, the apparent exclusion of 
the Commission in the historiography of the period is indicative of the processes of 
reconstruction of public memory in China today.8
From conventional to transcultural historiography
Although the Chinese Commission to Cuba is rarely the subject of specialized 
examination, it does belong to the larger history of coolies,9 which is an integral 
part of the historiography of the Qing dynasty and of Sino-foreign relations. 
Despite some fundamental differences of opinion, many Chinese and Western 
historians have agreed on a number of operational assumptions concerning 
8 Scholarly literature that touches upon the Chinese Commission to Cuba has largely utilized a 
similar corpus of primary sources. From the Chinese perspective, the coolie history has been written 
on the basis of Chinese Emigration: Report of the Commission Sent by China to Ascertain the Condition 
of Chinese Coolies in Cuba (Shanghai: Imperial Maritime Customs Press, 1876, http://pds.lib.harvard.
edu/pds/view/44812135 [Accessed 24.11.2014], and the coolie petitions, dispositions, and letters 
reproduced in Chen Hansheng 陳翰笙 ed., 華工出國史料彙編 [Collection of Historical Materials 
on Overseas Chinese Laborers] (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1985). From the Western perspective, a great 
deal has been written based on the US and British diplomatic correspondence, parts of which were 
published in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1861-) (hereafter: Foreign Relations) and British Parliamentary Papers (Shannon: 
Irish University Press, 1968) (BPP). Little use has been made of Spanish archival materials, especially 
the correspondence between Madrid and its representatives in China. Autobiographical writings of the 
Spanish coolie trade company representatives in China also deserve further exploration in the studies 
of the coolie trade. These papers are located in El Archivo Histórico Nacional (AHN) and El Archivo 
General de la Administración (AGA).
9 Critical examinations related to Chinese coolies have been written in English and Spanish. In 
English, see Lisa Yun, The Coolie Speaks: Chinese Indentured Laborers and African Slaves in Cuba 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2008); Evelyn Hu-DeHart, “Chinese Coolie Labor in Cuba 
in the Nineteenth Century: Free Labor or Neoslavery,” Contributions to Black Studies 12 (1994); 
Robert Irick, Ch’ing Policy toward the Coolie Trade, 1847–1878 (Taipei: Chinese Materials Center, 
1982); and, Arnold Meagher, “Introduction of Chinese Laborers to Latin America,” (PhD diss. UC 
Davis, 1975). For Chinese-language Studies, see fn. 8. In Spanish, see Manuel Moreno Fraginals, El 
Ingenio: Complejo Económico Social Cubano del Azúcar (Barcelona: Critica, 2001); Juan J. Pastrana, 
Los Chinos en las Luchas por la Liberación Cubana, 1847–1930 (Havana: Instituto de Historia, 
1963); Juan J. Pastrana, Los Chinos en la historia de Cuba, 1847–1930 (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias 
Sociales, 1983).
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nineteenth-century Qing Dynasty and Chinese–Western diplomatic relations. For 
decades, historiographical approaches to the study of Sino–Western relations have 
seen the two “sides” as distinct monolithic entities. The Western “impact” and the 
corresponding Chinese “reaction” described in the scholarly literature is heavily based 
on this East–West dichotomy.10 This causal reasoning corresponds well with arguments 
made in modernization theory about China’s path to the modern world. Furthermore, 
coolie history is widely assumed to be indicative of the last Chinese imperial dynasty’s 
weakness in confronting the Western powers. For instance, the Zongli Yamen––the 
Office of the Qing Dynasty, which was created to handle foreign affairs––is often 
described as inexperienced and as submitting to the wishes of the Western nations; 
as being a form of Chinese bureaucracy that merely received imperial orders or acted 
upon the direct commands of its chief, Prince Gong. Rarely have historical studies 
focused on the collaborations among and between the Chinese and foreign diplomats, 
and their collective influence on eventual Qing policies vis-à-vis Western countries.
Beyond these preconceived notions of monoliths, duality, and causality in coolie 
history, both Western and Chinese accounts have reconstructed the past of the coolie 
trade as part of the larger narrative of China’s victimization. Particularly vivid in the 
1960s and 1970s, virtually all PRC publications related to the Chinese coolies have 
depicted the coolie trade, along with the Chinese Commission to Cuba, as further proof 
of Western imperialism’s impositions upon the Chinese people. The Chinese coolies, 
their families, and the entire nation were seen as helpless victims in Western hands, and 
the crimes of the coolie trade were laid at Western feet alone.11 These absolute depictions 
of Western victimizers and Chinese victims are part of a public and academic rhetoric, 
albeit more subdued, that is heard in the People’s Republic of China to this day.12
10 See Ssu-yü Teng and John K. Fairbank, China’s Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 
1839–1923 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954); John K. Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on 
the Chinese Coast (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953).
11 For example, see Ding Zemi 丁則民, “Meiguo pohai Huagong shiji” 美國迫害華工史輯 
[Historical Chronicle of Chinese Workers under American Oppression], Lishi jiaoxue 歷史教學 
3 (1951): 5–8; Zhang Zhilian 張芝聯, “1904–1910 nian Nanfei Ying shu Delansiwaer zhaoyong 
Huagong shijian de zhenxiang” 1904–1910 年南非英屬德蘭斯瓦爾招用華工事件的真相 [The 
Truth about the Employment of Chinese Workers in British Transvaal in South Africa, 1904-1910], 
Beijing daxue xuebao 北京大學學報 3 (1956): 77–96; Shi Jun 史軍, “Du yidian shijie shi” 讀一點世
界史 [Reading Some World History], People’s Daily, April 9, 1972. Such portrayals continued even 
shortly after the Cultural Revolution, see Luo Rongqu 羅榮渠, “’Nuli’,’kuli’ de xueleishi—” “奴
隸”、“苦力”的血淚史— Ya Fei La bei yapo minzu de gongtong kunan 亞非拉被壓迫民族的
共同苦難 [“Slaves” and “Coolies”: Sufferings Shared by the Oppressed Asian, African, and Latino 
Peoples], People’s Daily, November 13, 1977.
12 Li Nanyou 李南友, “Haiwai Huagong xueleishi” 海外華工血淚史 [History of Blood and Tears of 
Overseas Chinese Workers], People’s Daily, November 27, 1983; also see the documentary, Huagong 
juntuan 華工軍團 [Army of Chinese Laborers], 6 episodes, first broadcast in 2009 by CCTV. Directed 
and written by Guilin Zhang, Xiaobin Wang, Yongqing Chen, and Zhihong Ren. http://jilu.cntv.cn/
humhis/huagongjuntuan/videopage/index.shtml [Accessed 03.12.2014].
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However, some recently released sources indicate that the coolie trade was 
never a one-sided venture involving only the Spaniards.13 Indeed, both 
Chinese and Spanish agents were heavily involved in creating, expanding, 
and maintaining the international network in human trade. This paper intends 
to demonstrate that the Commission to Cuba in 1874, which eventually 
resulted in the end of this trade, was also an outcome of a close cooperation 
between Chinese, Westerners in Chinese employ, and Western diplomats who 
were willing to work across national boundaries to achieve goals that were 
beyond their particular state interests. From the planning of the Commission 
to the execution of its duties and securing the consequences for its report, the 
“West” was in fact heavily involved, in most cases even on the Chinese side. 
The leadership of the Zongli Yamen invited participation from known and 
trusted foreign colleagues working in the Chinese customs; Prince Gong, the 
chief of the Zongli Yamen, knew full well that the complicated diplomatic 
encounters between China and Spain which resulted from the allegations of 
coolie abuse could be best resolved with assistance from a team of Westerners 
such as Robert Hart, A. MacPherson,14 and Alfred Huber, all of whom worked 
in the Chinese customs. In this respect, the state and the institutions of state 
in the late Qing period merit further examination since the national labels, 
categories, and boundaries that have until now framed their analysis appear 
to be at odds with the historical record.
The Spanish coolie trade and the creation of the Chinese Commission
Although Chinese laborers had been going abroad to work since the eighteenth 
century,15 the institutional structure and global organization of the coolie trade 
first materialized in the 1840s. Taking advantage of the newly signed Treaty of 
Nanking, British firms such as Tait & Co. and Syme, Muir & Co. dominated 
the human trade between China and the British possessions abroad in the 1840s 
and early 1850s. Coolie stations were established along the Chinese coasts, 
but coolie recruitment was largely delegated to local Chinese crimps. When 
the British Parliament passed legislation against the coolie trade in 1855, the 
13 In the last decade, the reorganization of the Spanish national archives has made access to the 
primary sources of the coolie trade from the Spanish perspective possible. Particularly relevant is the 
archival material from the Ministry of Overseas Affairs (Ministerio de Ultramar), which sheds light 
on the four-decade-long diplomatic negotiations between Madrid and Peking over the coolie trade.
14 In all the Spanish, Chinese, and English sources, I have yet to come across the full first name of 
MacPherson.
15 One of the first organized Chinese mass migrations followed a Dutch initiative in the seventeenth 
century. See Army Vandenbosch, “A Problem in Java: The Chinese in Dutch East Indies,” Pacific 
Affairs, vol. 3, no. 11 (November 1930): 1001.
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dominant position in the trade was taken over by Spanish firms––for instance, 
La Zulueta y Compañía and La Alianza––whose agricultural operations in Latin 
America required manpower far beyond what the African slave trade could 
provide, even if it had not been hampered by the British navy’s efforts to cut 
off the supply lines. The sugar industry in Cuba and guano fertilizer excavation 
in Peru were labor-intensive businesses, and their continuation and expansion 
was seriously threatened by a lack of workers. Thus, in the entire two hundred 
year-history of the international coolie trade it was during the 1860s and 1870s 
that these Spanish companies imported the largest number of laborers.
Growing in tandem with this huge importation of Chinese indentured laborers, 
were voices opposing the coolie trade. From coolie recruitment and treatment 
onboard transport ships to working conditions in Latin America, local Chinese 
officials, Western diplomats, and newspapers inside and outside of China made 
their objections known. Of particular concern were Sino–Spanish recruitment 
practices, which were seen as the most barbarous offense, since the majority of 
coolies were lured to Latin America under false pretenses. In the early 1850s, 
as many coolies later testified to the Commission, many Chinese in Southern 
China were aware of the cooperation that existed between the Spanish agents 
and their Chinese counterparts:
Spanish vessels come to China, and suborning the vicious [sic] of 
our countrymen, by their aid carry away full cargoes of men, of 
whom 8 or 9 of every 10 are decoyed.16
The kidnapping and luring of Chinese males into the barracoons or onto 
coolie ships caused widespread turmoil in various places in Southern China, 
particularly near the ports opened for foreign residence and foreign trade 
through the 1842 Treaty of Nanking. Local petitions asked for help from 
the public, and printed reports in newspapers described the disappearance of 
Chinese men and the subsequent destruction of families.17 Equally important 
to the local officials who took up the matter was the fact that the economies in 
these regions suffered as a result of the coolie trade. In 1860, for example, Lao 
Chongguang 勞崇光 (1802–1867), Viceroy of Liangguang, staged a raid on a 
Spanish ship in Canton, from which more than one hundred chained Chinese 
coolies were rescued.18 By then, most British firms had already been prompted 
to withdraw from the coolie trade, and British diplomats now pressured 
16 Cuba Commission Report, 7.
17 Wu Jianxiong 吳劍雄, Shijiu shiji qianwang Guba de Hua gong 十九世紀前往古巴的華工 
1847–1874 [Chinese Laborers Heading to Cuba During the Nineteenth Century] (Taipei: Academia 
Sinica, 1988), 9.
18 British Parliamentary Papers, vol. 4: 202–203.
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the Qing government to ban the trade with Spain, citing unrest in Southern 
China.19 Among the most vocal diplomats campaigning against Spanish coolie 
trade was Rutherford Alcock (1809-1897), the British minister to China from 
1865 to 1869. During his tenure in Peking, the British government signed the 
Emigration Convention of Peking (1860), which provided safeguards for the 
well-being of Chinese coolies contracted by British firms.20
The US envoys in Peking were equally adamant in their resistance to the coolie 
trade. Many based their arguments on humanitarian grounds. One representative, 
Peter Parker (1804-1888), who had been an ordained Presbyterian minister and 
medical doctor in China before beginning a diplomatic career, reiterated that 
the trade should be banned primarily on humanitarian and religious grounds. 
During his tenure as the American minister to China between 1855 and 1857, 
Parker was confronted with repeated reports about this human trafficking, 
much of it involving American ships. In 1856, he publicly denounced the 
coolie trade, appealing to all Americans in China not to be part of it. Labeling 
it as “irregular and immoral traffic,” Parker argued that this inhumane business 
would eventually damage the relationship between China and the United States 
altogether. He found further support in the rhetoric of the growing American 
abolitionist movement. For him, features of the coolie trade “strongly resembled 
those of the African slave trade in former years… exceeding the horrors of the 
‘middle passage.’”21 Parker also raised concerns about the treatment of the 
coolies in Cuba and Peru to his colleagues from the Zongli Yamen.
However, it would be naive to argue that these anti-coolie trade sentiments 
were solely grounded in humanitarian concerns. Economic and pragmatic 
considerations also played an important role in driving the opposition against 
the Sino–Spanish coolie trade. Some American diplomats, such as Humphrey 
Marshall, argued that it was in American economic interests to stop the Chinese 
coolie trade immediately. Marshall, the first US Commissioner to China, 
explained that American agricultural production, particularly in the South, 
would be threatened by Latin American competitors who were continually 
employing “cheap Chinese labor.”22 Himself a planter from Kentucky, 
Marshall wrote to the Secretary of State in 1853 with an estimate that each 
Chinese coolie cost eighty dollars per annum to employ, “far below the cost 
of slave labor, independent of the risk which the planter runs in his original 
19 Yun, The Coolie Speaks, 21.
20 After the signing of the convention, the costs of coolie procurement became so high that many 
British planters decided to stop importing more Chinese coolies. See Meagher, The Coolie Trade, 249.
21 “Public Notification of Peter Parker,” January 10, 1856. Parker Correspondence, 625–626.
22 House Executive Document 123, 33rd Congress, 1st Session, 78–85, 104–107, 116–121.
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investment.” In addition, Marshall argued that the Chinese were “patient of 
labor, tractable, obedient as slaves,… [and] will compel from the earth the 
maximum production.”23 In his conclusion, he claimed that the coolie trade, 
if allowed to continue, would challenge American political and economic 
power; he thus recommended that the president promote policies that would 
ban the involvement of American ships in the coolie trade.24
In addition to these humanitarian and economic motives, the US diplomatic 
corps in Peking was also concerned that the coolie question would affect overall 
Sino-Western relations and, perhaps more importantly, damage the Westerner’s 
image in China. Benjamin Parke Avery (1828-1875), Chief American Envoy to 
the Qing Empire between 1874 and 1875, summarized it succinctly:
Apart from the motives of humanity, growing out of our desire to 
ameliorate the condition of the Chinese now in Cuba and to effect 
a reform for the future, we feel that a failure to settle the pending 
dispute on a basis that will remove all causes of complaint about 
the treatment of Chinese by Spain would react against foreigners 
generally, in the estimation of the people of this empire, and by 
intensifying their hatred for us, lead to increased difficulties in our 
relations with them.25
Despite these calls to action by American and British diplomats, initial 
reactions from Qing officialdom were tepid throughout the 1860s.26 This 
indifference, however, changed in the early 1870s, when Prince Gong was 
faced with two key incidents and realized that he needed to address the issue 
directly. First, the Spanish consul in 1871 requested permission to open a 
coolie recruitment center in Canton, which had already been approved by the 
local governor. In the following year, the Spanish consul once again asked the 
Zongli Yamen to approve his plan to open more recruitment centers across 
Southern China. Upon approval, a Spanish coolie agent, Francisco Abella of 
the Zulueta Company, petitioned the local officials in Amoy for permission 
to open his own recruitment center. However, Abella’s specific petition was 
refused by the local governor because of abuse allegations against the Zulueta 
23 Ibid., 78–82.
24 Moon-Ho Jung, Coolies and Cane: Race, Labor, and Sugar in the Age of Emancipation 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 19.
25 Avery to Fish, No. 168, Foreign Relations, July 7, 1875.
26 In fact, this was the observation made by both the American and Spanish envoys in Peking at 
that time. See Williams to Fish, No. 134, Foreign Relations, November 6, 1873; AHN, Ultramar, 
5198, Exp. 6.
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Company that had surfaced in the press. The Spanish minister then demanded 
that Abella be reimbursed the sum of $300,000 for his loss. The Zongli Yamen 
refused, but the Spanish diplomats continued to exert pressure.27
At around the same time, the already abysmal conditions among Chinese 
coolies became so serious that the coolies themselves appealed to the 
American consul in Lima for help; he in turn forwarded their petitions to the 
US State Department, where they were turned over to Samuel Wells Williams. 
Williams then presented the actual petitions written in Chinese by the coolies 
to the Zongli Yamen. These petitions described the oppressive circumstances 
under which the coolies were working and living every day, and the coolies 
themselves asked the emperor to do whatever was possible to save them from 
their misery. As Williams added,
The condition of these laborers is very lamentable. Far off in a distant 
land, they have met this suffering and misery, and they are like birds 
in a cage out of which there is no escape… [I would suggest] that 
you may devise deliverance and succor.28
Although it was not exactly a requirement of his position, and he was certainly 
under no obligation to do so, Williams urged the staff of the Zongli Yamen to 
demonstrate that the emperor was not altogether overlooking the petitions of 
his people in Peru. He further suggested that, before the Qing government could 
send its own envoy to Peru to protect its citizens, the American ambassador 
in Lima might be able to help on behalf of the Chinese officials. But Williams 
also pointed out that although the American diplomats could help, the Zongli 
Yamen had to first ask the US president for this courtesy directly.29 At first, the 
reaction was subdued. As Williams recalled,
These officials expressed their sympathy with their suffering countrymen, 
regretted that they should have been inveigled into such a miserable, 
cruel, servitude, and hoped that the evils would soon be mitigated, but 
they had no vivid sense of their own responsibilities in the matter, and 
made no inquires as to the most desirable means of doing anything.
Soon afterwards, however, Williams received a much more positive response 
directly from Prince Gong, who signaled his awareness of the matter and indicated 
that he would deliberate as to what solutions were at his disposal.30 In fact, Prince 
27 Irick, Ch’ing Policy toward the Coolie Trade, 249–250.
28 Prince Gong to Williams, No. 37b, Foreign Relations, July 17, 1871.
29 Williams to Fish, No. 37, Foreign Relations, July 26, 1871.
30 Prince Gong to Williams, No. 37b, Foreign Relations, July 17, 1871.
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Gong had already decided to act. He first contacted most of the foreign envoys 
in Peking to corroborate the allegations of coolie abuses in Latin America. The 
envoys for Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Spain, 
and the United States all received a letter from Prince Gong asking their opinion 
on the Sino–Spanish coolie trade, inquiring into the allegations, and seeking 
suitable suggestions for resolving the problem. But no one would confirm the 
allegations on the record, and Francisco Otín, the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires to 
China, even vehemently denied them.31 Some diplomats said that evidence was 
the key to determining what course of action the Qing government should take. 
Mr. Fergusvan, the Dutch Minister in China, expressed that
every country has the right to see that its subjects who emigrate to other 
lands are well treated there; and if China has undoubted proof that the 
laborers who have gone abroad have been cruelly treated, no matter 
in what country, she has the right to inform the high officials of that 
country that Chinese coolies can no longer be allowed to go there.32
Several foreign diplomats as well as foreigners working for the Chinese 
Maritime Customs Service urged Prince Gong in one way or another to send a 
delegation to Cuba to investigate the abuse allegations. After listening to these 
opinions, Prince Gong finally asked Emperor Tongzhi in 1873 for approval to 
send an investigative team to Havana. In his memorial to the emperor, Prince 
Gong specifically mentioned the advice given by Robert Hart, the Inspector-
General of the Chinese Imperial Maritime Custom Service,33 to create a team of 
suitable experts for this purpose. Significantly, it was also Hart, who prepared a 
standard questionnaire with fifty-one items for the Commission to follow.34 True 
to Hart’s academic training in Belfast, which had included legal and humanist 
studies,35 his instructions to the Commission presented a specific, systematic set 
of questions that was intended to elicit facts as well as personal experiences. The 
answers to these and other inquiries ultimately formed the basis on which the 
Qing government acted to put an end to the Spanish coolie business.
31 AHN, Ultramar, 5194, Exp. 39.
32 Avery to Fish, No. 151, Foreign Relations, March 31, 1875.
33 Chouban yiwu shimo 籌辦夷務始末 [The Management of Barbarian Affairs in its Entirety], Vol. 
91, 27–29.
34 Avery to Fish, No. 151, Foreign Relations, March 31, 1875.
35 Quite different from today’s college major selections, Hart’s undergraduate degree at Queen’s 
University in Belfast followed a liberal arts program in which he studied a wide variety of subjects 
such as languages, history, and philosophy. Importantly, his program included a year-long legal 
training before he graduated in 1853. See Queen’s College Calendar of 1853, located at the Special 
Collections at the Queen’s University of Belfast, which indicates Hart’s graduation and academic 
program.
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Hart was anything but a narrow-minded customs bureaucrat. He appears to 
have had a personal interest in the success of the Commission as well as in 
making sure that the public knew of its work. In addition to developing the 
questions to elicit information from the coolies, Hart used the newspapers in 
China and abroad to promote the agenda of the upcoming Commission. Familiar 
with the power of the press in the West, he contacted all major newspapers 
in Shanghai, urging the editors to print news concerning the Commission to 
Cuba.36 He must have been pleased to see that many newspapers in China 
frequently published reports about the Commission and the coolie situation in 
Latin America. Even before its start, the Commission received wide coverage 
in the Chinese and foreign press.37 National newspapers, such as the New York 
Times in the United States, the Shenbao in China, el Diario de la Marina in 
Cuba, and the Times in the United Kingdom, all frequently reported on the 
Imperial Commission. Some of these Chinese and foreign newspapers would 
later receive materials concerning the Commission’s findings from Robert Hart 
directly.38 The purpose of the Commission and details about its members39 the 
complaints of the coolie “slaves,”40 and finally the Commission’s activities in 
Cuba,41 all were subject of detailed reports in the newspapers. The English-
language newspapers in particular, many of which had connections to Hart, 
provided extensive coverage on the team members, particularly on Chen 
Lanbin 陳蘭彬 (1816–1895), the chief commissioner.42
The members of the Chinese Commission to Cuba
In the minds of Prince Gong and Robert Hart, the Commission (see Table 
1) had to be international in nature. Prince Gong first selected Chen, who 
at that time was the Chief Officer of the Chinese Educational Mission in 
36 Hart to Campbell, No. 149, The I.G. in Peking: Letters of Robert Hart, 1868–1907 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1975), April 21, 1876.
37 For reports prior to the return of Cuba Commission, see North China Herald, October 4, 1873 
(vol. 28, issue 0335), February 12, 1874 (vol. 29, issue 0354), May 2, 1874 (vol. 29, issue 0365).
38 Hart to Campbell, No. 149, Letters of Robert Hart, April 21, 1876. In this letter, Hart gives 
instructions to his associate to whom the materials should be delivered.
39 “Arrival of Chinese Commissioners,“ New York Times, February 20, 1874.
40 “Cuba: The Chinese Commission––Slaveholder’s Alarms,” New York Times, February 21, 1874.
41 “Zhongguo pai shichen fu Guba guo” 中國派使臣赴古巴國 [China Sends Special Envoy to 
Cuba], Shenbao, October 10, 1873.
42 For coverage on Chen Lanbin see, for example, China Mail, December 18, 1873, and North 
China Herald, December 25, 1873. Various transliterations of Chen’s name appear in contemporary 
English and Spanish publications: They include “Chin Lan Pin,” “Chin Len Pin,” and “Chan Lan-pin.”
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the United States, where he managed the educational program for a select 
group of Chinese schoolboys in Hanover, New Jersey. The choice of Chen 
to head the Commission seemed advantageous. First, he was one of the very 
few Chinese officials who had diplomatic experience abroad. Moreover, 
Chen came from Guangdong Province, where most coolies originated, and 
could communicate with them in their local languages and dialects.43 On the 
advice of Hart, Prince Gong nominated A. MacPherson, a British national, 
and Alfred Huber, a French national, as the other two commissioners. Both 
had been working under Hart in the Chinese Maritime Customs Service for 
years. At the time of their nominations to the Cuba Commission, MacPherson 
was the Commissioner of Customs at Hankou, and Huber held the same 
43 Williams to Fish, No. 134, Foreign Relations, November 6, 1873.
Fig. 2: Chen Lanbin 陳蘭彬 (1816–1895), Chief Commissioner of the Cuba Commission. 
(Wikimedia Commons)
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position in Tianjin. Both were able to read and speak Chinese fluently44 
and were well known in the foreign community in China.45 Prince Gong’s 
selection of these three individuals was not arbitrary or without purpose. In 
his memorial to the emperor in June 1873, he indicated that foreign nationals 
were included in the planned Commission with two specific goals in mind. 
First, the Commission, especially through the presence of MacPherson and 
Huber, should be familiar with Cuba and the Cuban people [不至有人地生
疏之慮]; and second, in order to preempt Spanish complaints of partiality, 
an international delegation would provide unbiased observers whose final 
assessments would win approval from other nations [足以關日國之口而服
各國之心].46
On September 21, 1873, imperial approval for the delegation was granted, 
and Prince Gong announced the establishment of the Cuba Commission 
with a core membership made up of Chen, MacPherson, and Huber. The 
appointment of the rest of the delegation was left up to Chen, who received 
this news while stationed in Hartford, Connecticut. Having worked in a 
diplomatic and educational capacity for some years, Chen already had staff 
in the United States upon whom he could rely. His deputy in Washington 
was Yung Wing 容閎, the first Chinese graduate of an American University.47 
Yung Wing recruited two Americans to the Commission, Luther Northrop, 
who in New Haven had played host to two boys from the China Educational 
Mission, and Henry Terry, both of whom had legal knowledge and knew 
Spanish. Chen’s confidant in the United States, Zeng Laishun 曾蘭生, a 
Singaporean with Chinese heritage, went to Havana to prepare for the 
Commission’s upcoming trip.48 In February and March 1874, Chen, 
MacPherson, and Huber traveled separately from Washington D.C., Hankou, 
and Tianjin to Havana, where they began a two-month investigation into the 
allegations of abuse of Chinese coolies.
44 Ibid.
45 MacPherson apparently enjoyed a good relationship with the American legation in Peking. 
Samuel Wells Williams, the American chargé d’affaires in Peking at that time, directly provided 
MacPherson with a copy of the decree of O’Donnell in 1860, and the recent law of Valmaseda, 
ordering the reengagement of coolies in the United States. See Williams to Fish, No. 134, Foreign 
Relations, November 6, 1873.
46 Chouban yiwu shimo, Vol. 91, 29. “日國” denotes Spain.
47 Yung Wing (1828–1912), graduated from Yale University in 1854. While Chen and his 
international team were travelling to Cuba, Yung was accompanied by two Americans who were 
heading to Peru for another investigation of the working conditions for coolies there.
48 Edward J.M. Rhoads, “In the Shadow of Yung Wing: Zeng Laishun and the Chinese Education 
Mission to the United States,” Pacific Historical Review 43 (2005): 19–58.
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Journey and investigation of the delegation in Cuba
On March 17, 1874, the full Commission convened in Havana, where they 
first met with the Spanish Governor General in Cuba. Immediately afterward, 
they paid visits to all Western diplomats in Cuba to consult with them 
concerning their investigation.52 Consular representatives from Great Britain, 
France, Russia, the United States, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, Italy, and Portugal were all informed of the 
Commission’s purposes in Cuba.53 While the conflict was strictly between 
China and Spain, this important move to involve all the Western powers most 
likely came from discussions between Commission members Chen, Huber, and 
MacPherson, as well as others. Among these meetings, of particular importance 
was the discussion between the Commission and José Maria de Eça de Queiroz, 
the Portuguese consul in Cuba and a known opponent of the introduction of 
coolies. To Chen Lanbin, the Portuguese consul gave a detailed depiction of 
maltreatments suffered by Chinese coolies in Cuba, expressing his special 
concerns about the unethical practice of re-contracting, which was employed 
by the Spanish planters after the end of the original term of eight years.54
52 Cuba Commission Report, 2–4. This route of the Commission in Cuba is an approximate 
drawing, according to the descriptions stated in the Cuba Commission Report. The Commission 
visited numerous plantations in all key agricultural sites, where coolies were heavily populated.
53 Cuba Commission Report, 2.
54 The Portuguese diplomat remained outspoken on the coolie trade, despite repeated attempts by 
the planters to buy his silence in front of the delegation. See Eduardo Marrero Cruz, Julián de Zulueta 
y Amondo: Promotor del Capitalismo en Cuba (Havana: Ediciones Unión, 2006), 76.
Fig. 3: The Commission’s Journey in Cuba. Map:Detail from Thomas Jeffreys, The Island 
of Cuba with part of the Bahama Banks & the Martyrs, 1775. (David Rumsey Map Collection)
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After meeting with foreign diplomats in Havana, the Commission began 
interviewing Chinese coolies in same city over a period of nineteen days. To 
form a deeper understanding of the coolies’ living situation, it spent five days in 
Matanzas, three in Cardenas, three in Colon, three in Sagua, four in Cienfuegos, 
four in Guanajay, and one in Guanabacoa. The Commission completed a trip 
through the most important sugar-producing cities of Cuba, where they were 
able to see, talk with, and observe the Chinese coolies firsthand, in plantations, 
warehouses, refineries, and prisons.55 Chen and the others also discussed matters 
with the local Spanish sugar planters and with Julián de Zulueta, the most 
important oligarch in Cuba and owner of much of the Sino–Spanish coolie trade.56
While in Cuba, the Commission strictly complied with diplomatic protocol. 
During its investigations, local Spanish officials determined all the hours of 
visiting the warehouses and prisons. Visits to the plantations would take place 
only after prior arrangements with business owners had been made. Thus, 
except for the conversations they had with coolies on the street, the results of 
the Commission’s investigation were no surprise to the Spaniards. Although 
the interviews were conducted in Chinese and usually led by the Imperial 
Commissioner, the Western members were present and understood the accounts 
through a translator.57 In addition to the verbal accounts, the Commission 
members were able to see with their own eyes the wounds inflicted on the 
coolies. Verified by personal inspections, current and past wounds of the coolies 
were noted. The Commission documents included the narratives of individual 
coolies and the injuries allegedly inflicted upon them by their masters: the 
loss of ears, loss of sight, loss of fingers, loss of teeth, and so forth, as a result 
of beatings by their employers.58 These documents—both the testimonies 
and the final report—were all the more telling, as the coolies talking with the 
Commission were facing potential retaliations from the Cuban planters.59
On May 8, 1874, the Commission concluded its investigation and left Havana. 
Shortly after its departure, the Spanish newspapers in Cuba summarized its 
journey on the island. The sugar planters appear to have had no illusions about 
the eventual results of the report. It would, the editorials argued, place the 
Cuban planters and the entire Spanish coolie trade in an unflattering light. One 
55 Cuba Commission Report, 3.
56 “Cuba: The New Decrees––Immigration to the United States––The Chinese Commission,” New 
York Times, May 14, 1874.
57 Cuba Commission Report, 4.
58 Cuba Commission Report, 39.
59 Yun, The Coolie Speaks, 45-48.
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Cuban newspaper, El León Español, succinctly described local sentiments 
shortly after the Commission had departed from Havana:
Neither is it probable that the visit of the commissioner Mr. Chan Lan Pin 
will stop producing its impacts nor was it done for the fun of making the 
trip. And, frankly speaking, since his upcoming reports to his country 
must be unfavorable to us, one should believe, without venturing much, 
that the arrival of the Asian colonists, as has been verified until today, 
will either stop completely or be significantly restricted.60
The editorial was correct. The written and oral testimonies from the Chinese 
coolies collected by the Commission constituted a scathing indictment of the 
Cuban sugar planters and the Spanish authorities on the island. Based on 1,176 
individual testimonies made by the coolies, the Commission argued that the 
employment contracts were virtually meaningless because neither the Spanish 
authorities nor the Cuban business owners complied with the terms allegedly 
agreed upon.61 Almost 90 percent of the Chinese coolies testified that they had 
been sent to Cuba without their consent. Additionally, upon termination of the 
contract, the coolies were not freed or provided a means of returning to China; 
instead, they were held with the assistance of the local Spanish authorities and 
continued to work in Cuba. Without hope of ever returning to China or gaining 
their freedom in Cuba, many coolies committed suicide. As a result of these 
circumstances, less than 2 percent of all Chinese coolies ever saw their homes 
in China again.62 With their stacks of documents, the Commission headed back 
to Washington D.C. to compile and translate its final report.
Chen returned to Peking in late 1874, armed with the final written reports 
regarding the allegations of coolie abuse.63 After much discussion within the 
Zongli Yamen, contacts were resumed between the Chinese foreign office 
60 El León Español, May 17, 1874. “[…] la visita del comisionado Sr. Chin Lan Pin, ni es probable 
que deje de producir sus efectos ni que se haya hecho por ganas de pasear; y como, hablando con 
franqueza, sus informes al llegar a su país deben sernos poco favorables, se puede creer, sin tener que 
aventurarse mucho, quela venida de colonos asiáticos como se ha verificado hasta el día, o cesará 
del todo o se restringirá notablemente.” As cited in José Luis Luzón, “Chineros, diplomáticos y 
hacendados en La Habana colonial: Don Francisco Abellá y Raldiris y su proyecto de inmigración 
libre a Cuba (1874),” Boletín americanista, Nº. 39-40 (1989), 148. My translation.
61 Cuba Commission Report, 3.
62 Evelyn Hu-Dehart, “Chinese Coolie Labor in Cuba in the Nineteenth Century,” Contributions in 
Black Studies 12 (1994): 3; Cuba Commission Report, 150–151.
63 It is unclear if MacPherson and Huber returned to China before Chen did. Archival documents 
only indicate that Chen went back to China with Ye, who was also a member of the Commission. 
See Irick, Ch’ing Policy toward the Coolie Trade, 301. In any case, the final Commission Report and 
their translated copies, which are dated to October 20, 1874, were signed by all three commissioners.
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and Western diplomats in Peking in February 1875.64 Prince Gong sent a 
package of materials to the Spanish envoy, the diplomats of the Five Powers 
and––deliberately violating his original agreement with the Spaniards––to 
representatives of other Western powers. In the package the Zongli Yamen staff 
included the damning report about the Spanish coolie trade written by Chen, 
MacPherson, and Huber, along with a significant number of coolie testimonies.
Not only did the Zongli Yamen send the materials to the diplomats in Peking 
but the Chinese diplomatic staff also forwarded the Commission report, which 
included a Chinese version besides English and French, to many officials 
64 Avery to Fish, No. 151, Foreign Relations, March 31, 1875.
Fig. 4: Editorial condemning the coolie trade, Shenbao, March 17, 1875. (Library of the 
Institute of Chinese Studies, Heidelberg)
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throughout the country. This act, coupled with the efforts of Robert Hart to 
alert the media about the report, spread the news about coolie abuses to all 
the major Chinese cities, where newspapers reprinted the key findings of the 
report and added editorial commentaries.65 Shortly thereafter, the international 
press also reacted to the Commission’s report with extensive coverage.66
Consequences and aftermath
Francisco Otín, the Spanish envoy in Peking, visited the Zongli Yamen 
in March 1875 and registered three separate official protests. First, he 
complained that an American jurist had been added to the team (since Terry 
had not been included in the original list). Second, he criticized the absence of 
Chen, MacPherson, and Huber in Peking for cross-examination by the Spanish 
legation and demanded their presence. And third, he insisted that the definitive 
final report should be written in both English and Spanish instead of Chinese 
because the Spanish representatives did not read Chinese.67 He further added 
that the Zongli Yamen should not have sent the report to all the embassies 
in Peking.68 A rumor also began circulating that Spain was getting ready to 
take military action against China and would particularly target Taiwan.69 
Li Hongzhang 李鴻章, the senior statesman in Peking, and Ding Zhenduo 丁
振鐸, the Viceroy of Minzhe, believed that Spanish threats were just “empty 
words”;70 nevertheless, both men began making military preparations in 
anticipation of a Spanish landing in Taiwan or Southern China. The Zongli 
Yamen, for its part, refused to accede to Spanish demands, since Prince Gong 
had been informed by Hart that on the coolie question China was enjoying the 
advantage in diplomatic circles as well as, according to assessments of the 
media coverage, in the eyes of the public.71
65 “Jielu Zongli Yamen chaban zhao gong chu Yang shi laiwen” 節錄總理衙門查辦招工出洋事來文 
[Summary of the Zongli Yamen’s Inspection on the Worker Recruitment for Overseas], Shenbao, March 
10–16, 1875. Also “Shu shichen deng bing fu chakan Guba Hua yong qingxing bingce gong jie hou” 
書使臣等禀復查勘古巴華傭情形禀册供結後 [Conclusion of the Inspection of the Chinese Laborers 
in Cuba], Shenbao, March 17, 1875.
66 For instance, see “Suppression of the Coolie Trade,” New York Times, February 26, 1877 and “El 
fin de la colonization asiatica,” El Diario de la Marina, January 28, 1877.
67 AHN, Ultramar, 5194, Exp. 39.
68 Chouban yiwu shimo, vol. 91, 27–29.
69 Irick, Ch’ing Policy toward the Coolie Trade, 293–294. The Spanish legation had repeatedly used 
military threat as a threat. See Hart to Campbell, No. 66, Letters of Robert Hart, October 9, 1873.
70 Ibid.
71 Hart to Campbell, No. 66, Letters of Robert Hart, October 9, 1873.
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After publication of the Commission report, a number of Western diplomats 
wrote to their home countries reporting on the public reaction in China. Their 
writings suggested that the moral standing of all Westerners had suffered 
damage. The US Minister to China, William Evarts, to give one example, 
wrote to the Secretary of State,
a great deal of information in regard to the sufferings of the Chinese 
in Cuba has been given to this government and scattered around the 
empire, and the good name of all Western peoples has been more 
than compromised in consequence.72
After reading the report and witnessing the Chinese reaction to the matter, the 
members of the Western diplomatic corps in Peking seem to have distanced 
themselves from their Spanish colleagues. In communications to their home 
countries, these diplomats expressed their conviction that the report was 
factually correct and voiced support for the Chinese cause. The American 
diplomat Avery, for example, indicated that along with other Western 
diplomats, he would be willing to act as a mediator between China and Spain 
and to facilitate efforts on behalf of the Chinese to obtain redress for the 
abuses, protect the coolies, and stop the continuation of the Spanish coolie 
trade. He was certain that his colleagues in other Chinese ports would join in 
efforts to prevent further illicit coolie trade.73
Negotiations between China and Spain did, in fact, take place in Peking 
between 1875 and 1877, and were conducted under the auspices of the Big 
Five. Finally, on June 1, 1877, the Spanish ambassador in Peking signed a 
new treaty with the Qing government. It officially put an end to the Spanish 
coolie trade, which for all practical purposes had stopped in 1874.74 In the 
final ratified agreement “concerning the emigration of Chinese subjects to the 
island of Cuba,”75 Spain agreed that in the future it would not recruit coolies by 
force or trickery.76 China was to send a permanent mission to Cuba to monitor 
the condition of the coolies,77 while Spain was forced to pay for the return of 
72 Seward to Evarts, No. 78, Foreign Relations, January 10, 1878.
73 Avery to Fish, No. 151, Foreign Relations, March 31, 1875.
74 The details of the Sino-Spanish negotiations and diplomatic ruptures were reported by the 
Spanish envoy to the Ministry of Overseas Affair in 1877. See AHN, Ultramar, 5221, Exp. 50.
75 AHN, Ultramar, 279, Exp. 4. “Convenio relativo a la emigración de súbditos chinos a la isla de 
Cuba.”
76 Ibid., Article 1.
77 Ibid., Article 2.
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former coolies to China.78 Moreover, all Chinese coolies still in Cuba were to 
be released following ratification of the treaty.79 In 1879, the first permanent 
Chinese consulate in Havana was established, allowing Chinese officials to 
observe and regularly report back to Peking on the well-being of those coolies 
who had yet to finish their contracts into the 1880s.
Concluding remarks: revisiting the dichotomy in Sino-foreign relations  
This paper has discussed the Chinese Commission and its trip to Cuba in 
1874, the reasons for its establishment in response to the Spanish coolie 
trade, the identities of its members, its investigation in Cuba and subsequent 
report, and the aftermath of its activities, including an eventual formal ban 
on Sino–Spanish human trafficking in 1877. At every step in the process, 
the Commission was the product of a series of interactions between Chinese 
and non-Chinese: The coolie trade between China and Latin America started 
with cooperation between Chinese crimps and Spanish agents; the decision 
to dispatch an investigative commission to Cuba was the result of the 
exchange of information and opinion involving Qing officials, Westerners 
in the employ of the Qing customs, and Western diplomats; although the 
Commission was chaired by a Chinese with overseas experience, the majority 
of the Commission’s members were foreigners in Qing employ, and their 
involvement in the investigation in Cuba was critical to its ultimate success; 
the extensive coverage by the international press, which increased the impact 
of the Commission and its findings considerably, was the result of Hart’s 
making use of his extensive contacts with the editors of Chinese and foreign 
language papers published in China as well as with the international press. 
Thus, in the end the substance of the Commission to Cuba differed markedly 
from a conventionally understood “Chinese” delegation. The history of Chen 
and his team demonstrates that none of the traditional units, such as “China,” 
“the West,”  “the Zongli Yamen,” “Great Britain,” or the “United States” can 
serve as suitable explanatory tools with which to explain the motivations and 
actions of the individuals involved. As the work of the Commission suggests, 
foreigners working as Qing officials were willing to act in the Chinese interest 
even outside their contractual duties in the customs for the following reasons: 
independent of the attitude of the country of their citizenship, they agreed with 
the basic thrust of the Commissions’ work; diplomats were willing to support 
a Chinese cause against one of their “Western” members because they agreed 
with the public opinion in their home countries that the Chinese indeed had a 
78 Ibid., Article 4.
79 Ibid., Article 16.
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case; because the growing public Chinese clamor against the abuses threatened 
to endanger the standing of foreigners in China altogether; and because doing 
the right thing might be useful in shielding their own agriculture from the 
competition of cheap indentured labor. In this context the traditional units of 
analysis are largely meaningless. I suggest that they conceal rather than reveal 
the transnational nature of the process in which this Commission came about 
and worked, as well as the transcultural interaction in the articulation of the 
values that carried it to success.
On an individual level, foreign diplomats were rarely unrelenting imperialists 
or virtuous saviors of the Chinese coolies. Instead their actions appear to have 
been guided by a number of motives, including personal experiences, and were 
driven only partly by national interests. The private advice given by Western 
diplomats to Prince Gong, the mediation provided by the diplomats of the Big 
Five, and the consular assistance of the European representatives in Lima and 
Cuba were all part and parcel of the humanist beliefs and pragmatic goals of 
these diplomats. The line between Chinese and non-Chinese diplomats was 
often––if not always––contested. Robert Hart, A. MacPherson, Alfred Huber, 
and Samuel Wells Williams were certainly “foreign” in the sense that they 
held British, French, or American passports, but they also worked tirelessly 
for a “Chinese” cause. As the work of Prince Gong, Hart, Chen, MacPherson, 
Huber, and Williams illustrates, national boundaries and state affiliations in the 
late imperial age remained entangled constructs with changing features.
An even more problematic aspect of the traditional historiography is that it 
has reduced Sino–foreign interactions to a dualistic simplification of historical 
events like the coolie trade, which necessarily entailed a Western “impact” 
and a corresponding Asian “response.” Equally critical is the notion that the 
West and China assumed their roles as oppressors and victims, respectively. 
Under this East–West dichotomy, research questions such as “Why was 
China unprepared for Western contact?” and “How did the Western powers 
use diplomacy and war to gain power in China?” have surfaced; this kind 
of framework does not allow for analysis other than one driven by the 
anachronistic racial or national agendas that may have never been primary 
considerations for most actors.
Certainly, one can attribute the relative neglect of the Commission to Cuba 
in both academic circles and public debate to a number of factors. Primary 
materials concerning the Commission are scattered across different continents 
and are written in different languages. Furthermore, Spain has long been 
regarded as having played a largely insignificant role in the Asia–Pacific 
region and as being a lesser power in Europe. But the most important factor, 
I would argue, appears to be the incompatibility between the history of the 
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Commission and the master narrative of late imperial Chinese history. To be 
sure, the perception of a major Chinese diplomatic victory against a European 
power in protecting Chinese citizens abroad does not correspond well with the 
storyline of a victimized, weak, and helpless Qing Empire.
The study of the Commission to Cuba as an integral part of Sino–foreign 
relations in the nineteenth century provides a critical angle to the prevailing 
master narrative and offers some crucial lessons: that we not let an essentially 
cross-border phenomenon be falsely observed through the lens of the nation-
state; that we ought to pay more attention to the ways in which Western and 
non-Western actors interacted in the nineteenth century, particularly in the 
context of Sino–foreign relations; and that racial and national labels may not 
always adequately explain the motivations governing the actions of people. A 
different approach to examining Sino–foreign relations in late imperial China 
might better serve us in truly understanding the period. At a time when human 
trafficking is still a booming business in many parts of the world, a revision 
of traditional, preconceived notions might provide a fuller explanation of the 
driving forces and operational mechanisms behind such illicit trade.
